Response to Cassandra
The critics this week are all very negative. But most suggestions made are meant constructively and some ideas are worth close scrutiny.
The DA can't form a majority government on its own in Cape Town. We polled over 40% of the votes in Cape Town, and the ANC nearly 40%. The next city government is balanced on a knife's edge.
I believe this week's Cassandra complex misses the mark. In its own right, 40% of the vote in Cape Town is hardly insignificant. This 40% is the DA's core constituency: 40% of the voters of Cape Town vote DA when they are asked. We've known the extent of our core constituency since about 1998 or 1999. Before that, many of those people voted National Party in the past and, in fact, nearly all previous National Party supporters now vote DA. This should surprise nobody, and can be instantly verified by cross-checking with the results of previous elections in which the Nats participated.
The support for the DA in other cities is quite as resilient, and similarly shouldn't be trivialised. In Johannesburg our share of the vote is slightly eroded, but in Pretoria it is slightly increased. The DA's not going to disappear, it is not in decline, and we have no reason to think that the writing is on the wall.
So why is everybody worrying about Cape Town? Because the DA vote went from 53% last election to 41% in this? Laurence Caromba says: 'The problem is that as fast as the ANC is losing support, the DA is losing it faster.' Let's now look at that.
Some observers look at a 'decline' of support for the DA from the 53% in 2000 that created a government (later demolished by floor-crossing) to 41% in 2006 and describe it as an absolute decline in DA support. This is ludicrous. We know where those 'missing votes' are - in the back pocket of the Independent Democrats. Do the maths. If you add the ID's vote to the DA's you are back where you started in 2000 - or, indeed, 1994. The ANC has made no gains, and the DA's message of 'don't split the opposition vote' is precisely on target.
I don't for a minute want to describe the ID's support as somehow illegitimate. On the contrary, we in the DA should be asking ourselves hard questions about how it came about that this new party can take a fifth of the vote away from us. We just know that these voters will be disappointed at the next floor-crossing. It will give the ANC a lot of trouble to poach the minimum nine DA councillors in order to erode our elected numbers. But the ANC will find it relatively easy to steal a minimum of three ID councillors. Splitting the opposition vote has never been more dangerous or costly. Maybe we didn't make that clear enough to the voters of Cape Town.
This 10% of voters who lent their support to the ID in this election are not to be dismissed lightly. We know, roughly, who they are. Most of them live in Mitchell's Plain, and some of them live in Atlantis, Kensington, Grassy Park, Lotus River and Ottery. In those suburbs, the vote split three ways. In all of them except Mitchell's Plain the ANC benefitted from the split.
What's psephologically interesting about these voters is that they voted for the Nats in the 1996 and 1999 elections, for the DA in 2000 and for the ID in 2005 and 2006. These are, unexpectedly in South Africa, undecided voters. South Africans believe that voter support for parties is very fixed, and so it is; but here is the great exception.
Electorally, here is a place where the DA must be critical of itself. We have, perhaps, grown excessively used to the idea of a core constituency; and though we work hard during elections to mobilise these people, we do not devote sufficient time and resources to persuading the undecided voters of Cape Town to elect our candidates. We can and will work on changing that. What we know is that this 10% of Cape Town voters have, in the past, voted for the DA, and now vote for the ID. They did not vote for the ANC, and never have. These voters are not the ANC's to gain, they are the DA's to lose.
From a core constituency a party can draw supporters, funds, a definite base of votes and, most importantly, a sense of legitimacy and permanence. In this country, only the ANC, the DA, the IFP and, in a special sense, the ACDP have this kind of legitimacy and permanence. All other parties depend on the degree to which the three biggest parties have tiny undecided margins. The PAC, Azapo and the UDM feed on voters on the periphery of the ANC. The VF+ is absorbs marginal DA voters. The only place in the country where undecided voters are a fairly large block is Cape Town, which explains why some marginal parties like the ID tend to do well here. But the ID requires to do well solely among undecided voters: their support base is volatile and transient by its nature. I will be surprised if ID support stabilises, and will feel vindicated if it evaporates, UDM-style, at the next election.
Whether or not we pursue and persuade this group of 10% undecided voters, the DA simply can't forget the 40% of Cape Town voters who already vote for us. The 40% have always supported the DA, and they really, really matter. At base, it is these people who we must represent most fiercely. We will disappoint them if we spend all our time chasing after new votes at their expense.
Brendan Boyle in the Sunday Times has this about the ANC:
'As the provincial leadership of the ANC hunkered down yesterday to plan its recovery from the electoral disaster wrought by months of bitter party in-fighting, a source said its strategy for the next five years would be "to break the back of the DA in this province".'
Very well then. The DA doesn't wish any harm to come to the ANC or its supporters. Our nation is a liberal democracy, in which people may champion causes that one does not like and with which one does not agree. We in the DA contest the ANC's ideas, policies and government, but we don't oppose their democratic rights.
When the ANC speaks of breaking the back of the DA in the Western Cape, they suggest not only that the ANC does not accept the legitimacy of the opposition party, but they question also the legitimacy of opposition voters. They are actually attacking our core constituency.
And when, in consequence of attacks of this kind, the DA seems pugnacious and inclined not to cooperate with the ANC, we essentially have the interests of our constituents at heart. Ah, but 'the DA simply doesn't seem patriotic enough,' says Laurence. But we are patriotic, in the same sense that our constituents are patriotic. When they and we are attacked by the government of the day we defend the rights to which we are all are entitled, because we are citizens of South Africa. South Africa is not monolithic like the ANC; we are a people of many parts and traditions, and there must be room for all of us. Our definition of patriotism requires a synthesis of these traditions, and we believe that if the back of our liberal tradition is broken, then South Africa will be a much poorer place.
Laurence also says that 'for the good of the both the party and the country, [the current DA leadership] should take the opportunity to usher in a new generation of leaders, and then step aside.' In due course this will happen; and as you rightly say, it will happen for the good of the party and the country. It will not happen now. We elect our leaders in a constitutional manner at the Federal Congress of the DA after sober reflection on the interests of our constituency and our nation.
He continues with 'the DA's biggest mistake was getting too caught up in their own anger towards the government.' We are caught up in a much more general public anger towards the government, Laurence. Forgive me if I mistake you, but I gather you also are angry with the government in many ways. You voted for the DA. Should we not represent your interests? How would it serve better to misrepresent you? What anger should we discard? Should we welcome the Firearms Control Act? Should we practice Aids drugs appeasement? Should we peacefully accept tender corruption as a fact of patriotic South African life? Angry we may be, but we are not unguidedly angry, because there are good reasons to be angry.
And we are not blindly rude to the ANC. The ANC government has done some things well. We may well govern some municipalities with them, perhaps Cape Town itself, but this will not hinder the DA's usual mode of constructive criticism.
Farrel Lifson says that the DA 'desperately need a prominent municipality (like Cape Town) to prove to voters that they are capable of governing effectively and can do a better job than the ANC.' I also think the DA will be more credible when we show we can govern. The point is largely political, though - we can and will represent the interests of our constituency whether or not the DA is in government.
zaBlogger says: 'If current opposition parties can't take a large bite out of ANC support in this environment then frankly they should quietly wander off into the sunset a let a new set of opposition parties/leaders come to the fore.' Must the DA's existence be judged by our ability to destroy or undermine the ANC? We don't accept that. The ANC has its own business to attend to, and we will ever be the faithful watchdog. Our own success will be measured by our loyalty to our constituency.
I'm not sure if a true rebuff was needed to the depressed and anxious articles on the future of the DA. The sense is that the writers all have an interest and enthusiasm for oppositional politics; they fear to be let down by the DA; they fear we will not fulfil the mandate given to us. If I write a rebuff it suggests that I somehow believed their pessimism was fundamentally wrong. It is not wrong to be pessimistic; but pessimism is misplaced. Oppositional politics isn't going away in South Africa, not while the DA can help it. The oppositional mode is needed just as much as ever because the ANC seems to see a chance finally to flatten it altogether.
Do not see the ANC's arrogance as a cause for despair, because it is an opportunity for all South Africans. In the DA we have mobilised potent support against the ANC, as we demonstrated in the local election. Having done that, and so refreshed our mandate, we again will attempt to teach the leaders of the ANC the lesson they must learn: that democracy is a resolution of the many parts of Man.
The DA can't form a majority government on its own in Cape Town. We polled over 40% of the votes in Cape Town, and the ANC nearly 40%. The next city government is balanced on a knife's edge.
I believe this week's Cassandra complex misses the mark. In its own right, 40% of the vote in Cape Town is hardly insignificant. This 40% is the DA's core constituency: 40% of the voters of Cape Town vote DA when they are asked. We've known the extent of our core constituency since about 1998 or 1999. Before that, many of those people voted National Party in the past and, in fact, nearly all previous National Party supporters now vote DA. This should surprise nobody, and can be instantly verified by cross-checking with the results of previous elections in which the Nats participated.
The support for the DA in other cities is quite as resilient, and similarly shouldn't be trivialised. In Johannesburg our share of the vote is slightly eroded, but in Pretoria it is slightly increased. The DA's not going to disappear, it is not in decline, and we have no reason to think that the writing is on the wall.
So why is everybody worrying about Cape Town? Because the DA vote went from 53% last election to 41% in this? Laurence Caromba says: 'The problem is that as fast as the ANC is losing support, the DA is losing it faster.' Let's now look at that.
Some observers look at a 'decline' of support for the DA from the 53% in 2000 that created a government (later demolished by floor-crossing) to 41% in 2006 and describe it as an absolute decline in DA support. This is ludicrous. We know where those 'missing votes' are - in the back pocket of the Independent Democrats. Do the maths. If you add the ID's vote to the DA's you are back where you started in 2000 - or, indeed, 1994. The ANC has made no gains, and the DA's message of 'don't split the opposition vote' is precisely on target.
I don't for a minute want to describe the ID's support as somehow illegitimate. On the contrary, we in the DA should be asking ourselves hard questions about how it came about that this new party can take a fifth of the vote away from us. We just know that these voters will be disappointed at the next floor-crossing. It will give the ANC a lot of trouble to poach the minimum nine DA councillors in order to erode our elected numbers. But the ANC will find it relatively easy to steal a minimum of three ID councillors. Splitting the opposition vote has never been more dangerous or costly. Maybe we didn't make that clear enough to the voters of Cape Town.
This 10% of voters who lent their support to the ID in this election are not to be dismissed lightly. We know, roughly, who they are. Most of them live in Mitchell's Plain, and some of them live in Atlantis, Kensington, Grassy Park, Lotus River and Ottery. In those suburbs, the vote split three ways. In all of them except Mitchell's Plain the ANC benefitted from the split.
What's psephologically interesting about these voters is that they voted for the Nats in the 1996 and 1999 elections, for the DA in 2000 and for the ID in 2005 and 2006. These are, unexpectedly in South Africa, undecided voters. South Africans believe that voter support for parties is very fixed, and so it is; but here is the great exception.
Electorally, here is a place where the DA must be critical of itself. We have, perhaps, grown excessively used to the idea of a core constituency; and though we work hard during elections to mobilise these people, we do not devote sufficient time and resources to persuading the undecided voters of Cape Town to elect our candidates. We can and will work on changing that. What we know is that this 10% of Cape Town voters have, in the past, voted for the DA, and now vote for the ID. They did not vote for the ANC, and never have. These voters are not the ANC's to gain, they are the DA's to lose.
From a core constituency a party can draw supporters, funds, a definite base of votes and, most importantly, a sense of legitimacy and permanence. In this country, only the ANC, the DA, the IFP and, in a special sense, the ACDP have this kind of legitimacy and permanence. All other parties depend on the degree to which the three biggest parties have tiny undecided margins. The PAC, Azapo and the UDM feed on voters on the periphery of the ANC. The VF+ is absorbs marginal DA voters. The only place in the country where undecided voters are a fairly large block is Cape Town, which explains why some marginal parties like the ID tend to do well here. But the ID requires to do well solely among undecided voters: their support base is volatile and transient by its nature. I will be surprised if ID support stabilises, and will feel vindicated if it evaporates, UDM-style, at the next election.
Whether or not we pursue and persuade this group of 10% undecided voters, the DA simply can't forget the 40% of Cape Town voters who already vote for us. The 40% have always supported the DA, and they really, really matter. At base, it is these people who we must represent most fiercely. We will disappoint them if we spend all our time chasing after new votes at their expense.
Brendan Boyle in the Sunday Times has this about the ANC:
'As the provincial leadership of the ANC hunkered down yesterday to plan its recovery from the electoral disaster wrought by months of bitter party in-fighting, a source said its strategy for the next five years would be "to break the back of the DA in this province".'
Very well then. The DA doesn't wish any harm to come to the ANC or its supporters. Our nation is a liberal democracy, in which people may champion causes that one does not like and with which one does not agree. We in the DA contest the ANC's ideas, policies and government, but we don't oppose their democratic rights.
When the ANC speaks of breaking the back of the DA in the Western Cape, they suggest not only that the ANC does not accept the legitimacy of the opposition party, but they question also the legitimacy of opposition voters. They are actually attacking our core constituency.
And when, in consequence of attacks of this kind, the DA seems pugnacious and inclined not to cooperate with the ANC, we essentially have the interests of our constituents at heart. Ah, but 'the DA simply doesn't seem patriotic enough,' says Laurence. But we are patriotic, in the same sense that our constituents are patriotic. When they and we are attacked by the government of the day we defend the rights to which we are all are entitled, because we are citizens of South Africa. South Africa is not monolithic like the ANC; we are a people of many parts and traditions, and there must be room for all of us. Our definition of patriotism requires a synthesis of these traditions, and we believe that if the back of our liberal tradition is broken, then South Africa will be a much poorer place.
Laurence also says that 'for the good of the both the party and the country, [the current DA leadership] should take the opportunity to usher in a new generation of leaders, and then step aside.' In due course this will happen; and as you rightly say, it will happen for the good of the party and the country. It will not happen now. We elect our leaders in a constitutional manner at the Federal Congress of the DA after sober reflection on the interests of our constituency and our nation.
He continues with 'the DA's biggest mistake was getting too caught up in their own anger towards the government.' We are caught up in a much more general public anger towards the government, Laurence. Forgive me if I mistake you, but I gather you also are angry with the government in many ways. You voted for the DA. Should we not represent your interests? How would it serve better to misrepresent you? What anger should we discard? Should we welcome the Firearms Control Act? Should we practice Aids drugs appeasement? Should we peacefully accept tender corruption as a fact of patriotic South African life? Angry we may be, but we are not unguidedly angry, because there are good reasons to be angry.
And we are not blindly rude to the ANC. The ANC government has done some things well. We may well govern some municipalities with them, perhaps Cape Town itself, but this will not hinder the DA's usual mode of constructive criticism.
Farrel Lifson says that the DA 'desperately need a prominent municipality (like Cape Town) to prove to voters that they are capable of governing effectively and can do a better job than the ANC.' I also think the DA will be more credible when we show we can govern. The point is largely political, though - we can and will represent the interests of our constituency whether or not the DA is in government.
zaBlogger says: 'If current opposition parties can't take a large bite out of ANC support in this environment then frankly they should quietly wander off into the sunset a let a new set of opposition parties/leaders come to the fore.' Must the DA's existence be judged by our ability to destroy or undermine the ANC? We don't accept that. The ANC has its own business to attend to, and we will ever be the faithful watchdog. Our own success will be measured by our loyalty to our constituency.
I'm not sure if a true rebuff was needed to the depressed and anxious articles on the future of the DA. The sense is that the writers all have an interest and enthusiasm for oppositional politics; they fear to be let down by the DA; they fear we will not fulfil the mandate given to us. If I write a rebuff it suggests that I somehow believed their pessimism was fundamentally wrong. It is not wrong to be pessimistic; but pessimism is misplaced. Oppositional politics isn't going away in South Africa, not while the DA can help it. The oppositional mode is needed just as much as ever because the ANC seems to see a chance finally to flatten it altogether.
Do not see the ANC's arrogance as a cause for despair, because it is an opportunity for all South Africans. In the DA we have mobilised potent support against the ANC, as we demonstrated in the local election. Having done that, and so refreshed our mandate, we again will attempt to teach the leaders of the ANC the lesson they must learn: that democracy is a resolution of the many parts of Man.
posted by mal @ 7:25 AM
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